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More Cooperation, More Benefit?: 
An Analysis of Modern Trade Agreements
Evolving of free trade agreements creates not just a free, mutually beneficial trade between 
actors, but may results in elimination of non-tariff barriers. The European Union is by far and 
away the leader in liberalizing economic and monetary policies, while Canada disposes one 
of the most open and competitive markets in the world economy, and the United States is the 
biggest economy in nominal dollars and landing trading country in goods and services. This 
paper provides four scenarios through a game theoretic model in order to analyze whether 
players support or except each other in international trade by including the EU, Canada and 
the USA into the game. Specifically, the article examines that the US withdrawal from TTIP 
could be explained with the trade integrations impacts on each other.
A szabadkereskedelmi egyezmények megkötésével a létrejövő szabad, kölcsönösen előnyös 
cserén túl a nem vámjellegű akadályok is megszűnhetnek. Az Európai Unió fiskális és mo-
netáris politikája közel sem olyan liberalizáló, mint például a kanadai, ami egyike a leg-
nyitottabb és versenyen alapuló piacnak, vagy az Egyesült Államok, ami dollárban mérve 
a legnagyobb gazdaság és kereskedelmi ország áruk és szolgáltatások terén is. Tanulmá-
nyomban játékelméleti modellen keresztül négy forgatókönyvet vázolok fel azt vizsgálva, 
hogy a játékosok ((EU, Kanada és az USA) együttműködnek-e egymással nemzetközi ke-
reskedelemben. Pontosabban, a cikk azt vizsgálja, hogy az Egyesült Államok távozása a 
TTIP-ből magyarázható-e a kereskedelem integrációjának egymásra gyakorolt hatásaival.
1. Introduction
A key element that constitutes international trade between countries, regions and continents 
is regional trade agreement (RTA). Over the past years these agreements have changed signifi-
cantly. One can be seen both, increasing in number and in depth and complexity. Globalization 
has highly contributed to progress of transformation and government policy decision making 
process. Understanding these alterations are necessary in order to eliminate transparency in 
wide bilateral and multilateral trading system. 
Fundamental debate concerning trade agreements that freer trade is assumed to create a win-win 
situation for both parties or not, but answering this question is increasingly difficult, as the agreements 
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have became more complex. To examine the economic context is the most relevant, but also considering 
political, and other effects of these treaties. Many studies deals with inter alia growth effects on Transat-
lantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), 
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) by using specific methodology (as CGE mo-
deling), but less examine all of the potential outcomes concerning participants’ choices available. With 
the help of game theory, we give a comprehensive examination of the sort recommendation here in order 
to bridge an existing gap in a highly relevant issue like modern free trade agreements. The importance 
of these conventions, as well as its difficulty, is that go beyond the elimination of norms, rules, standards.
With the new measure of countries' profit is introduced, when they preserve their status quo 
position and interact. The second relates to the situation when a country could optimize its utility 
by choosing whether it engages in a free trade agreement with other countries, or not. The results 
in our examined cases show that a country yields higher profit, when it cooperated in free trade 
agreements. However positive the results are, a relatively lower growth rate as a result can be expe-
rienced. The evidences might be conclusive, but just in our cases. This has been identified at bila-
teral level, when policy makers aimed at making trade with those nations, regions, who are part of 
largest economies. New type free trade agreements could be an explanation for lower growth rate.
This article is organized as follows. After the introduction paper frames free trade agreements and 
examines their trends by placing regions in the literature. It is followed by analysis of economies’ inte-
raction with applied game theoretic model. Finally results are presented under the four different scena-
rios and last section concludes. The two main contribution factors for this are political and economic.
2. Framing free trade agreements, and other aspects
In the current world of increasing relevance, the regional agreements and cooperation grown 
apart. Although, cooperation and integration are frequently used synonymously, one need to dif-
ferentiate between them from a political and economic aspects. Cooperation is aiming at trade 
without explicit interest in moving beyond a free trade agreement, that includes low harmoniza-
tion level of economic policies, norms, standards. By contrast, integration aims at a higher form 
of collaboration. In this case a country loses its independent trade policy, and can harmonize 
economic policies, norms with many different countries. [Dieter, 2004]
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), United States-Mexico-Canada Ag-
reement (USMCA), Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) are exceptions to 
the free trade agreements are in this regard, because they supposed to create free trade areas by 
eliminating tariffs and non-tariff barriers between them. It includes the removal of services, key 
standards, norms, and regulations. These agreements are the so called “new generation” type of 
trade agreements [European Commission, 2017] beyond a trade liberalization, their scope are, 
inter alia, liberalization of public services, financial markets, cooperation in new rules creation, 
and protecting mutual investments. 
General trend that modern trade agreements consist of eliminating tariff and nontariff barriers 
(free movement of capital flows), protecting intellectual property right (patent, copyright), operating 
investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) and rule of origin regulations, harmonization of regulatory 
standards. When a government's economic policy is carried out concerning trade and welfare en-
hancing, it essentially creates winners and losers in the economy. This situation provides a context to 
investigate whether cooperation or competition brings greater economic benefits to players.
BLAHÓ ANDRÁS KÖSZÖNTÉSE 273INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS MULTIDISCIPLINARY DOCTORAL SCHOOL
In recent academic works the main focus is on "trade cost", that are often identified as "ice-
berg transport cost function". It means part of the profit "melts" in transportation of delivered 
goods because of geographical distance [Samuelson, 1952]. From other view, the literature also 
reflects other trade cost that appears in a general cost-benefit analysis for trade agreements: these 
cause better market access, and reduces tariff by liberalization, but on the other side they are also 
characterized by restriction in political environment, or multinational companies pressing on 
prices, and so forth.  However, one can be note that the gains may vary by inputs that are placed 
into an agreement. [Arokolakis, Costinot & Rodriguez-Clare, 2012]
Seating trade agreements is possible from two aspects. First, determines integration levels 
according to the typology by Bela Balassa that suggests the gradual deepening of collaboration 
between states in 5 stages: 1. free trade area, 2. customs union, 3. common market, 4. economic 
and monetary union, 5. political union. [Palánkai, Benczes, Kengyel, Kutasi, Nagy, 2011] Among 
definitions basic concept is free trade area, we suggest to OECD definition:
Definition 1: a grouping of countries within which tariffs and non-tariff trade barriers betwe-
en the members are generally abolished but with no common trade policy toward non-members. 
[OECD, 1999] 
It means, a free movement of goods and services with zero tariff rates, but set tariff by mem-
bers on non-members is not necessarily desirable. [Ju & Krishna, 1996]. At this level, free trade 
agreements are fundamental.
A categorization divide economic agreements into three main categories: 1. partial scope 
agreement (PSA), 2. free trade agreement (FTA), 3. custom union (CU), where the least integra-
ted agreement type is PSA, and the deepest is CU. [Baier, Bergstrand & Clance, 2017] Since the 
1990s, governments policies toward international integrations, where FTAs have become much 
more relevant compared to other agreement types. They contain eliminating more non-tariff 
barriers on average, that CUs. [Dhingra, Freeman & Mavroeidi, 2018] 
The World Trade Organization defines a regional trade agreements (RTAs):
Definition 2. In the WTO, these refer to reciprocal trade agreements between two or more 
partners to liberalize tariffs and services. They include free trade areas and customs unions and 
economic integration agreements on services. [WTO Glossary]
When it is successfully ratified, an interest desire of government policy is to get closer the count-
ries’ economy to a welfare optimum by reducing protectionism. [Rodrik, 2018] But it reaches only 
when a tariff is set at optimal level. [Zissimos, 2009] In addition a treaty able to manipulate term of 
trade that is a realistic motivation for countries to make agreements. [Grossmann, 2016] Although 
between term of trade and volume of trade, the latter is lighted better when policy makers care about 
trading issues. Trade volume impact on world market prices: in the beginning reducing import de-
mand causes lower world market prices and improved terms of trade, but it requires an increased 
export supply with export subsidies, or credits. To achieve this, countries apply subsidies and credits. 
Export supply will subsist, but prices will lower, thus term of trade will worsen. [Rodrik, 2018]
3. Trade Agreement Trends in the era of TTIP, USMCA, and CETA
The "next-generation" international economic agreements have relatively little link with tra-
ditional trade agreements. If we go back to 1817, it may be seen, that free trade based on the com-
parative advantage framed by David Ricardo. This determined the assumption that free trade is 
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the optimal policy, and a free trade agreement is economically beneficial to countries. Later, tra-
de liberalization, reduced import tariffs and other restrictions to the lowest level [Rodrik, 2011] 
and today, nations seek deep integrations, rather than shallow integration. [Lawrence, 1996] 
Now the trend is not only a creation of more free trade agreements, but also toward deepening 
and comprehensive agreements. These designed to embed one economy in other to shape the eco-
nomic framework within which governments, businesses, households operate and strengthen their 
position in the global economic context. [Haggart, Lauerate, Spence, 2017] Further they includes 
market access, elimination of technical barriers to trade, customs and trade facilitation, but sani-
tary measures, domestic regulation, financial, transport services, telecommunications, intellectual 
property, labour, electronic commerce and so on. Furthermore, it contains administrative and ins-
titutional provisions and protocols concerning conformity and manufacturing practices. 
Economic growth is a very discussed topic since the start of the international trade. As part 
of its, free trade agreements (FTAs) dominated weight of economies in global economic environ-
ment. However, not all FTAs are able to shape global trade in significant manner. The reduction 
of trade barriers created a more stabile and transparent markets, where countries enhances its 
export activities to partner countries and that is why trade projects are welcomed. Although at 
the same time, they may carry damages in sense of politics and economy. Governments have 
altered their policies over the last 20 years, and turned toward creating free trade. With changing 
of treaties and appearance of "mega-regional" trade agreements its number have increased sig-
nificantly. Comparison data, 79 regional trade agreements was in force in 2000, while this value 
increased to 2942 in 4 January 2019. [RTA/IS database]
Comparing top economies by export and import of goods and services in last ten years, the 
key economies remaining in almost the same position: the leader is European Union followed 
by United States and Canada among examined three economies. The EU and the US economies 
together accounting for about 50 percent of global GDP and nearly 30 percent of world trade 
flows. Canada has less impact on global trade, notwithstanding its role is important, because 
trade overwhelmingly is still tent toward the USA and EU. The USA Canada’s first trading part-
ner is the USA and second is the EU that gives to country a vulnerability. [European Comission, 
2017a] The trading system has been under pressure, since structural changes in world economy 
as BRICS countries’ rising, or globalization. Further under a highly competitive market environ-
ment, it is crucial that economies secure their main trading partners. Given the United States, 
Europe and Canada’ market size and structure, the diversity could be the key that open opportu-
nities to preserve their role both each other economies and in world economy. 
Global trade with fast economic growth spread around the world from 1990s. It is ten years since 
the global economic and financial crises that was a stop in international trade and world trade volume 
to GDP ratio. Before the crises, global trade expanded by around 7 percent a year that volume twice 
fast as the world economy. [Bank of Canada, 2017] After collapse, global trade decreased by 20 per-
cent in volume. Initially recovering has stared in 2009, but it could be seen sharply from 2010/2011. 
Although negative effects have gone out, it appears to trade volume to ratio has not recovered 
its dynamism and it is below the precrisis period. Regarding Canada, during the Great Recession 
2 Cumulative number of physical Regional Trade Agreements in force. This number accountig for 467, if 
separing all the notifications on goods, servicies and accessions.
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its exports plunged by about 20 percent. They rebounded quickly, but this process slowed down. 
United States followed the broader global pattern. Alone the European Union succeed to reach 
higher trade rate. Figure 1 illustrates trade performance to GDP ratio3 from 2007-2017. 
Chart 1. Trade to GDP ratio
Source: Author’s elaboration based on WTO data
The United States suggested to abolish all tariffs on goods at the Doha round, continuing this 
aspects, the Bush, and Obama administration has emphasized the importance of trade. Trump 
has been broken the global trading idea, and moved toward protectionism. Moreover tariff app-
lication appears in auto industry, steel and aluminium, The European Union is the world's largest 
single market area. Among its members free trade was one of the EU's aims, parallel with an 
opening up toward world trade. Canada’s economic policy claims trade as the most important 
tool that contributing economic development through the history. [Ritchie, 1997] 
In this sence, the USA, Canada and EU have taken steps to negotiate trade agreements as 
TTIP, USMCA or CETA. Restriction of external trade does not necessarily mean gain for eco-
nomic players, it might could appears only several sector as automotive industries, or electronic 
manufacture service. Although challenges and opportunities concerning trade continuing chan-
ge after a government actor has move from trade scene.
3 Trade to GDP ration here means the sum of exports and imports of goods and services measured as a 
share of gross domestic product. Aggregation Method is weighted average.
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3.1. The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, TTIP
TTTP is set to became one of the largest free trade agreements with coverage of around 30 percent 
of worldwide trade and 50 percent of global GDP, if once fully ratified by parties. In 2018 President 
Trump has expressed willingness to reopen TTIP, but for now the agreement is still on ice. It is being 
formed to link the world’s largest economies, the European Union and the United States. It would 
results approximately onethird of the global economic output. Combining these economies, a dee-
pener cooperation and economic benefits are expected. If the negotiation processes are reached and 
the agreement comes into force, it strongly determines future global trend and investment. The gains 
arise from lower prices of goods, higher product variety, and higher productivity. [Felbermayr, 2016] 
The regulatory changes may cause additional tariffs in some sectors (between 10 and 20 per-
cent) opposed to classic agreements, where this value accounts for only 4 percent. Further growth 
impacts would account for around 0.5 percent GDP growth in the European Union economy4 and 
it would be 0.4 percent for the United States. [CEPR, 2013] It shows, that the importance of TTIP 
claims to elimination of non-tariff barriers and adaptation of technical standards, rules rather than 
economic gains and it might goes beyond of these features also. It is now the greatest obstacle for 
activist groups and business that may lose in this process.  [Bacaria, 2015] [Kutasi, 2015]
Other effect relates to trade diversion and it will be created by the European Union itself. The 
integration has no internal trade barriers, thus a significant intra-EU trade operates within the 
region’s frontiers. If the United States eliminate the tariff and non-tariff barriers, part of the EU 
trade will be transferred to the USA. [Felbermayr, 2013] Let see an example. In the beginning EU 
countries trade each other, but if a member state starts to import from the United States, it will 
reduce the intra-EU trade, thus trade creation will a deteriorative effect for the EU. Furthermore, 
if the difference between the before and after trade volume is relatively high, the USA will not 
could compensate the member state for the impacts created by the trade diversion. 
3.2. The Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, CETA 
Partnership between Canada and the European Union is highly relevant as the EU is Canada’ 
second-biggest trading partner after the USA. The European Union’s ratio in Canada’s import 
accounts for 11.13 percent, while export is 9,01 percent in January 2019.The CETA was signed 
in 2016 and approved in 2017 by the Government of Canada and the European Union. Even 
though Canada is heavily influenced by the United States, the country represents strong political 
and economic ties, and cooperative relationships with the European Union. 
The agreement was recognized as a 'vehicle to create new prosperity' on both sides of the 
Atlantic Ocean. (Government of Canada & European Union, 2014) Both parties gains market 
access by liberalization, thereafter it entries into force. The European Union eliminates those 
custom duties of goods that originate from the EU, and Canada. The increased bilateral trade 
and investment flows contribute to economic growth and the region's external competitiveness 
4 A study estimates its effects on growth, employment and investment by CGE model in case of Hungary. 
The results are shown by sectors and similar compared to impact on the European Union. The results are 
compared with previous results. For more information, see Publication Kutasi, Rezessy, Szijártó [2014].
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comply with Europe 2020 strategy. [European Comission, 2017b] While it is a comprehensive 
and strongly liberalized free trade agreement, it is also highlighting standards. 
The parties underlined the importance of their ability to reach legitimate policy scopes regar-
ding public health, environment, safety, public morals and protection of cultural diversity. The 
main final negotiating result including the elimination of tariff for 99 percent that is the most 
comprehensive tariff reduction that the European Union has ever achieved. CETA even beyond 
tariff elimination, for example Canadian government procurement is open to foreign partners, 
or market access to ships has never been existed before CETA. Concerning intellectual property 
rights Canada has guaranteed to EU data protection, no discrimination relates to genetic drugs. 
Further standard element of the agreement is the ISDS. This mechanism was determined to 
make transparency, but preserves the states’ ability to regulate and protects the Investment Ca-
nada Act (ICA). 
3.3. The United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement, USMCA (NAFTA 2.0)
Under the Trump Administration, the United States has reached an agreement with Mexico 
and Canada that is modernized NAFTA into a 21th century trade agreement. The USMCA has 
signed in 2018 to support mutually beneficial trade and enhance competitiveness of regional 
exports in the region by free and fairer market access. [USTR, 2018] If successfully ratified by all 
countries, it will replace NAFTA. It is not drastically different from the old agreement, but some 
charges are placed concerning economic and trade policy. 
One of the key components of new agreement relating automobiles: the agreement requires 
that 75 percent of vehicles be manufactured with North American content (while NAFTA sub-
jects to rules of origin requirements of 62.5 percent content for motor vehicles). Furthermore, 
to the 2.6 million car, tariff is zero from Mexico and Canada. Although trade restrictions on ag-
riculture are strict, the USA and Canada make a concession to move toward greater agriculture 
liberalization. [CRS, 2019] USMCA would maintain investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) 
between Canada-Mexico, but it is not applicable to the USA and Canada. (Before it was worked 
as trilateral commitments.) NAFTA was the first agreement to deals with intellectual property 
right (IPR), and USMCA would retain these protections for these. 
The agreement escalates e-commerce, cross-border data flows and restricts data localization. 
Under NAFTA, internet was in its early phase, therefore there was no need to regulation, but 
globalization changes world and now prohibition of custom duties of electronically-transmitted 
products is included in the USMCA. NAFTA includes trilateral commitments for government 
procurement of goods and services, but in USMCA only the USA and Mexico applies these stan-
dards, To Canada compulsory using of World Trade Organization Government Procurement 
Agreement (WTO GPA) that ensures transparency and fairness in competition process. 
New provisions includes inter alia “achieve and maintain a market-determined exchange 
rate regime, refrain from competitive devaluation, through intervention in the foreign exchan-
ge market and strengthen underlying economic fundamentals, which reinforces the conditions 
for macroeconomic and exchange rate stability.” [USTR, 2018:ch33] Last momentum relates to 
withdrawal from the agreement. This is allowed, if a party enters into a trade agreement with 
another party, and it seems to be a non-market economy. [USTR, 2018]
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Table 1: Key elements of modern agr
eements
Source: Elaborated by author
4. Examining interaction of trade agreements
Countries’ optimal economic policy, henceforward the search for new markets to subsist in 
global trade competition. This strategy triggered both push and pull factors. The pull comes from 
the emerging countries, their rapid economic growth and market opportunities draw attention 
that developed countries’ own interest to opening toward the rest of the world. From Canada’s 
aspects, the country is under the United States’ umbrella that means, the US hampering market 
access with its continuing political actions. Canada in this situation could dealing with the USA, 
- for example, the NAFTA, and the USMCA created better access to the US markets, but they are 
still protected strongly- and cooperating with other economies by allowing better border flow in 
goods, services, labor, capital, and other factors. 
Even though the gravitational pull is powerful to Canada, past years’ experience came from the US 
reflects the importance of building markets overseas, to have alternative trading partners to keep pres-
sure on the USA in order to preserve their liberal trade. To the USA as one of the worlds of the biggest 
economic player, there is always the threats to apply protectionism toward its neighbor and other rele-
vant countries. Behind this policy, stands security obstacles after 9/11, trade war with China in order 
to reduce the states’ role in economy. Treaties created better access to the US markets, but progress is 
still slow. While the USA position itself as the strongest economic system for innovator companies, it is 
not as open as it shows itself. [Gold, 2017] Taking into China’s role in world economy, a fast emerging 
county with non-market economic elements as state capitalism and government-controlled policy. 
Furthermore enormous amount of capital and low-cost labour stream into sectors of eco-
nomy. All of these factors capable to distort prices in global markets. In this situation, the USA 
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needs to cooperate such economies such Canada, or the European Union. Last, but not least, 
taking into account the European Union’s position among great economic powers. Because its 
position is relative weak compared to the United States and China. For these reasons the agree-
ments seems to be foremost more strategic for the EU, than economically profitable. If it comes 
into force, it will be the most relevant ratified agreement for both the European Union and the 
United States that amplifies their role and determines their future condition in global trade.
A strong economy as the European Union could be Canada’s potential partner, managing the 
USA. The Canada-Europe deal serves this aim, although the two country’s market approach is 
different. The EU regards its economy, as a Single Market over against Canada’s more market-
oriented approach concerning reconciling business interest within a negotiation. This approach 
arguable belongs not just to Canada, but to whole North America, reveals in basic elements of 
TTIP negotiations, that corresponding with CETA. It is a balance that restore the level of be-
nefited players between the European Union and the United States, since the US benefits from 
trading by contracting NAFTA. To sum, it can be said, these transatlantic trade agreements de-
signed to link, therefore the three deals interact with each other.
5. Mixed Methodology
In our research context, case studies refer to the agreements between the United States, the 
European Union and Canada. Case studies are introduced based on their characteristic and 
function in global world trade. With the game theory, it is a mixed method approach, which 
allows to answer the paper's questions both qualitative and quantitative perspective. Taking by 
these countries, the article investigates the modern trade agreement as a phenomenon within its 
political and economic context. The mixed methodology highlights the elimination of tariff bar-
riers' unimportant role opposite non-tariff barriers. Although every country has an independent 
role in this study, the finding can converge and this independent role disappears. The results can 
integrate and make a general conclusion that forms the overall picture of the study. In this topic, 
most of the research has been implemented both qualitative and quantitative, less focus on a 
game theoretic approach. 
This multiple case study method provides a widely understanding the modern trade agree-
ments' practice. One of our interesting finding is the players' behavior that do not correspond to 
theoretical predictions relation rational choice theory. Further we can conclude that there is no 
exist only one answer in our cases for the main question. It resembles such a case as Bertrand's 
paradox, where one can experienced the absence of one answer for the presumed question. (Tis-
sier, 1984)
To examine cooperative opportunities among the USA, Canada, and EU, beyond political 
factors it is necessary to understand reasons behind treaties from an economic perspective also. 
Previous studies have not focused on any cooperative or competitive strategies relating these 
three participants, thus the study combines the two strategies. The main question is whether the 
three economies should cooperate with each other, or should they just maintain their status quo 
position if they are committed to improve their profitability. There have been taken cooperative 
initiatives as the examined agreements that make easier analyses to us. Using game theoretical 
approach, we investigate cooperative opportunities that lie among the tree economies as much as 
competitive strategy. The opportunities are categorized as four cases model:
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Table 2: Four cases model
Case 1 All the three economies remain their status quo position (Competition).
Case 2 Only the USA and EU cooperate (TTIP), while Canada stays out. 
Case 3 Only EU and Canada cooperate (CETA), while the USA stays out.
Case 4 Only the USA and Canada cooperate (USMCA), while Canada stays out.
After formulating these cases, we considered nominal GDP constant 2010, as an analytical 
tool and collected data first, for the mean annual trade between the years 2007 to 2017 for these 
economies, and second we modified beforehand results with estimating growth determined by 
computable general equilibrium (CGE) model. This model is used to estimate an economy’s 
reaction to changes in a government policy. Corresponding CGE outputs include assumptions 
made when draft alternatives. Estimating results (gains or losses) in GDP indicate the difference 
between the base and the established case. [Pelkmans, Lejour, Schrefler, Mustilli, Timini, 2014]
The mean annual GDP’s are used to reflect the profit, that origins from the four different 
cases. The final results are inserted into a payoff matrix. We expect, it could shows the players 
optimal strategy in order to comparison. 
5.1. Game Theory
Game theory both as a theory and a methodology tool to describe situations of conflict and 
cooperation among rational decision makers, who are the players. After evaluating outcomes, 
they make their choices based on that maximize their expected utility.The model framework that 
will be used for illustrate cooperative and competitive strategies between the European Union, 
the United States, and Canada in this paper can be described as a normal-form game. 
Definition 3. An n-player game in normal form, n ≥ 2, is a set [n] of players and a finite set of stra-
tegies Si for each player i. We denote the set of all strategy profiles of players other than i by S−i. Finally, 
for each I ≤ n and s ϵ S we have an integer payoff or utility uis. [Daskalakis & Papadimitriou, 2005:2]
Definition 4. Rational players possessed a payoff function π in any decision making situation 
(.) over strategies is rational if they choose a strategy a ϵ A that maximizes their payoffs. That is, a* 
ϵ A is chosen if and only if π(a*) ≥ π(a) for all a ϵ A. (Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944)
In this game, three basic elements are required and settled: players, laws of a game (strategi-
es), and consequences of player’s choices (payoff). [Kóczy, 2006]
Game theory is based on the assumption that players are absolutely rational when they make 
their strategic choices. [Neumann & Morgenstein, 2004] Rational behavior is more predictable 
compared to irrational behavior that narrows down the possibilities by excludes random actions.
Table 3: Payoff matrix that shows assumed profits (Profits in trillion US$)
Players N = {USA, EU, Canada}, 
Strategies Si = {Cooperate, Compete}
Cooperate strategy, when a players forms a free trade agreement, while 
competitive strategy means, participants remain status quo position.  
Payoff π = {Profit} Represents two countries trade with each other, expressed in US$.
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To set a game, it is necessary to set axioms. According to Neumann and Morgenstein [1944] 
utility theorem rational behaviour operates under axioms are then completeness, transitivity, 
continuity, and independence. An individual, who make a decision faced with probabilistic con-
sequences of different choices will behave as the players are maximizing the expected value of 
some function. In future, it is defined over the possible outcomes at some specified point.
Axiom 1. Completeness: either M is preferred, L is preferred, or the individual is indifferent. 
L ≺ M, M ≺ L, L ~ M
Axiom 2. Transitivity: assumes that preferences are consistent across any three options.
 If L  ≺M and M ≺ L, then L ≺ N, and similarly for   ~.
Axiom 3. Continuity: if L ≺ M ≺ N, then there exists a probability p ≺ [0,1], such that pL + 
(1 – p) N ~ M.
Axiom 4. Independence: if L ≺ M, then for any N and p≺ [0,1], pL + (1 – p) N≺ pM + (1 – p) N.
In a game theoretic model, it is required to rational players select the best strategy among all 
alternatives in order to maximize their rewards (utilities, incomes, profits, subjective benefits) 
[Chen, 2008] that is the purpose of the game at the same time. The predicted strategies for sol-
ving a game are presented as a solution. Given these assumptions, we expect the three players 
seek greater benefit in their strategy. To construct a payoff matrix concerning these economies, 
we obtain the profit for each cases. 
Table 4: Three player’s profit determination for four scenarios
Case 1 Profit = The median of nominal GDP (Time period: 2007-2017, constant 2010 
trillion US$)
Case 2 Profit = [The median of nominal GDP (Time period: 2007-2017, constant 2010 
trillion US$)] * [1 + estimated GDP growth by CGE modeling)]
CGE estimation: EU: 0,5%, USA: 0,4%
Case 3 Profit = [The median of nominal GDP (Time period: 2007-2017, constant 2010 
trillion US$)] * [1 + estimated GDP growth by CGE modeling)]
CGE estimation: EU: 0,02%, Canada: 0,36
Case 4 Profit = [The median of nominal GDP (Time period: 2007-2017, constant 2010 
trillion US$)] * [1 + estimated GDP growth by CGE modeling)
CGE estimation: USA: 0,00 %, Canada:0,02%
Source: World Bank Database, Felbermayr [2016], Burfisher, Lambert, Matheson [2019], European 
Comission [2017b]
6. Results
In this section, we present our findings for four scenarios, where players choose a strategy in 
order to maximize their profits. The profits are calculated for all four cases, and have been const-
ructed as a payoff matrix. It is shown in Table 2. from a fully competitive to partial cooperative 
solutions. Based on the results, the alliance between the United States and the European Union 
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brings the highest benefit in total profit. Regarding to the countries one by one, for all is better, 
if they engaged in some cooperative move. Despite of Canada’s smaller total profit, the economy 
is able to cooperate that is more rewarding compared to status quo. 
Table 5: Payoff matrix that shows assumed profits (Profits in trillion US $)
USA Canada EU Total Profit
Case 1: USA vs. Canada vs. EU π = 15.54 π = 1.69 π = 17.31 π = 34.55
Case 2: USA & EU vs. Canada π = 16.16 π = 1.69 π = 18.17 π = 36.03
Case 3: EU & Canada vs. USA π = 15.54 π = 1.75 π = 17.34 π = 34.64
Case 4: USA & Canada vs. EU π = 15.54 π = 1.73 π = 17.31 π = 34.58
Although, results do not diverge in large extent from each other. This strengthen the fact that 
TTIP, CETA and USMCA not seems to be profit-oriented trade agreements. In the background a 
more complex interacting process moves cooperation. We can regard to states’ behaviour as a black 
box. It is not possible to know its internal operation, just can perceive the input and output factors 
and can analyze its behaviour. According to the theory of rational choice, an individual seeks af-
ter the utility maximization, firms its profit maximization, while states their power maximization. 
[Kiss, 2003] Today trends show players diverge from the equilibrium more and more and choose 
such a strategy that gives a greater benefit rather than the security situation. [Forgó, 2009] 
The United States possesses a great power when engaging in a cooperative strategy and main-
tenance of this role may be implemented a competitive, rather than a cooperative environment. 
The reasons that is why the USA cooperate to Canada are on one hand it has a weak dominant 
role compared to the European Union, or the United States and the other hand, the countries 
are neighbors. For the EU, it seems to be desirable a great power in the world that explains its 
recourse to America.
Agreements could open the door to the world by giving opportunity each other’s market 
access and from the profit aspects, cooperation is the best solution, if a county choose a strat-
egy. From answering basic question from a political point of view, it can be explained Donald 
Trump’s withdrawal from TTIP, but economically this fact has not been argufy.
7. Conclusion
Firstly, we introduced modern trade agreements. Our findings, the base objective of trade 
agreements that is tariff elimination has not changed. Conversely some clear historical characte-
ristic relating trade agreements, stronger political and economic cooperation have appeared in 
recent years. After framing free trade agreements, we differentiate those from a past and modern 
perspective, thus now we are able to determine the most important components of modern trade 
agreements that are the followings: elimination of trade and non trade barriers, intellectual pro-
perty right’s protection, setting an investor-state dispute settlement and accession to government 
procurements. Secondly, we can conclude that since trade agreements no longer defined as a 
simply product trade across borders, it has been created a global value chain, thus rule of origin 
has acquired particular importance and belong to characteristics. 
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We chose actors on one hand by their relevance in international trade, on the other hand by 
their concluding trade agreements. This paper explored and explained why CETA and USMCA 
has entered into force, while TTIP has not yet by analyzing profits, and political factors of parti-
cipant countries namely the United States, the European Union and Canada. The used methodo-
logy has compared possible outcomes that based on players' choices available. The transatlantic 
trade agreement between the EU and Canada, and the "one continent" agreement among Ca-
nada and the USA looks increasingly likely to materialize, but TTIP has not escaped yet. These 
mega-regions have the capability to may impact on trade by trade diversion and trade creation.
We focused on actual polities and opposed to our hypothetical finding to draw a conclusion 
relating players' choices. As in the game, none of the player intent to remain their status quo 
position, rather they shift toward trade agreements. Moreover, for cases in which cooperation is 
a choice between two parties, they are unambiguously committed to abolish tariffs, although the 
state power as important factor appears when a decision making.
Finally answering our fundamental question, interaction is possible, that allow countries to 
choose a cooperation scheme (it could be neglect) ensuring the most beneficial outcome, that 
shows a rational player's decision. Regarding TTIP, the power that is discussed above is one of the 
explanation for withdrawal, but timing of this negotiation also mattered a great deal. The United 
States’ issue on traditional market access, especially on agriculture and automotive industry also 
could influence on the country’s behaviour. To sum, transatlantic deal appears increasingly unli-
kely, but the two other trade deals and their implication has strongly seems to be implemented.
This game theoretic approach is a useful tool in order to illustrate situations, but less known 
that strategic decisions’ result in optimal outcomes. We assume, but do not know. Without play-
ers’ strategic behaviour integrated into this model, our findings may not be generalizable. 
For future research, studies should consider these strategic interactions of players and il-
lustrate clearly in a pattern.
Further it is highly possible that a more complex cooperative and competitive game theoretic 
model could be used for examines trade agreements impact on FDI, unemployment rare, or 
inflation with extended data collection. In addition could be consider environmental and susta-
inability issues. 
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